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ABSTRACT
There is a common belief that the disappointing economic performance in
the 1970s can be attributed in good part to the interaction of tax rules,
inflation, and capital formation. In this paper, we reassess the
relationships between inflation, the tax code, and investment incentives
because previous results are based on a number of tenuous assumptions
whose impact has not beenfullyappreciated. We also question the
appropriateness of the conventional user cost formulation, and derive an
alternative measure taking explicit account of the role of debt ——
acquisition,retirement, and net—of—tax interest payments —andthe
equityholders' ownership of the firm. Ournumericalresults show that
previously reported disincentives for acquiring capital goods in general
and against longer—lived capital in particular are attenuated, and in a
number of cases reversed, under various sets of assumptions. Differences
in results stemming from the conventional and modified user costs are
highlighted, and are illustrated by a comparison of the U.S. Treasury's
tax reform proposals under the two formulations.
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Did the high inflation of the l9TOs depress incentives for
businesses to invest in plant and equipment? This question has been
investigated in a number of studies utilizing variants of the conventional
neoclassical user cost of capital, and a general conclusion emerging from
this work, shared by policyinakers (White House, 1981), is that the inter-
action of inflation with the existing tax code has reduced firms' incen-
tives to acquire capital (Feldstein, 1982, 1983, Kopcke, 1981). Inflation
affects investment decisions by causing variations in the value of tax
depreciation deductions, the firm's discount rate, and the cost of debt
(as we shall see, the latter two channels are not always identical)..i' In
this paper, we reassess the relationship between inflation and investment
incentives because previous results are based on a number of tenuous
assumptions whose impact has not been fully appreciated. These include
the adjustment of financial returns to inflation, the appropriateness of
the capital structure invariance assumption, and the role of personal
taxes. Calculations with a range of relevant parameters indicate that
previously reported disincentives for acquiring capital goods are
attenuated, and in a number of cases reversed, under various
configurations of these key assumptions. Our simulations highlight that
in an inflationary environment, incentives for acquiring longer—lived
capital are depressed relatively more than those for shorter—lived assets
only under a rather restrictive set of assumptions. Furthermore, we show
that the results are extremely sensitive to the exact values of underlying
parameters, which are unlikely to be known with any accuracy.—2—
Inconventional definitions of the user cost (Hall and Jorgenson,
1967)., the firm's discount rate is defined by the opportunity cost of
funds, a weighted average of the costs of equity and debt (including tax
considerations) with weights depending on the leverage ratio. Brock and
Turnovsky(1981) have shown recentlythat such a definition is appropriate
when the firm maximizes with respect to the joint interests of bondholders
and equityholders. However, in general, the interests of these agents
with financial clainis on the firm's capital may be in conflict. An alter-
native approach pursued in this paper is to assume thatthefirmmaximizes
withrespect to the interest of equityholders .and to view bondholders as
supplying a factor of production (debt) for which they are compensated
(interest plus principal). Our modified neoclassical model, derived
rigorously in Section II, gives explicit attention to the acquisition and
retirement of debt and to net—of—tax interest payments, and discounts the
firm'scash flows by the net—of—tax return required by equityholders.
Under some assumptions, the conventional and modified definitions are
identical but, when they diverge, their implications for investment
incentivescan differsharply. This divergence is illustrated in section
IV by an examination of the implications of the U.S. Treasury's tax reform
proposals (U. S. Treasury-, 198)4) under the conventional and modified user
cost expressions. Section V concludes.
II.The User Cost of Capital
Inthissection, we derive a modified expression for the user cost
of capital giving explicit attention to the ownership of the firm and to
the role of debt, and contrast our formulation with the conventional—3—
specification. The representative firm operates in the sole interest of
its existing shareholders, and is assumed to maximize the present
discounted value of its cash flow over an infinite horizon. The present
discounted cash flow (v(o)) in period 0 of an untaxed and unlevered
firm is
t
(1) v(o) =fexp(—fp(s,it)ds) {p(t) F(L(t), K(t))
0 0
—w(t)L(t) —q(t)1(t)) dt,
where p(s ,it)is the equityholders' nominal discount rate, which may be
related to the inflation rate(it). -?i The production function
(F(.)) depends on labor (L(t)) and capital (K(t)), and is assumed
strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. The firm operates
in perfectly competitive markets, and faces exogenous prices for output
(p(t)), labor (w(t)), and new capital (q(t)). To relate current invest-
ment (1(t)) to the existing stock of capital, we assume that capital
depreciates at an exponential rate (a) and hence is governed by the
following differential equation,
(2) i(t) =1(t)—oK(t).
The cash flow potentially available to shareholders is affected by
an income tax, a tax credit, and depreciation allowances on investment
expenditures. An income tax is assessed at rate (t) against the
firm's revenues less labor costs, and is reduced by a tax credit (k(t))
extended on the purchases of investment goods. The effective price of—J4—
capital goods is further lowered by depreciation allowances granted
against taxes and based on both current and past investments,
t
(3) TD(t) =' (t) fD(t—s,s, L) qjs) I(s) ds,tc[O,D) C —
whereD(t —s,s, L) are tax depreciation allowances per dollar of
investment made t —speriods ago according to the tax code in effect in
period s for an asset with life L. Equation (3) can be rearranged to
isolate those factors that depend on current decisions and those that are
predetermined at time T (Ha3rashi, 1982),
(la) TD(t) =z(t,p(t, it), L) q(t)1(t)+ A(t, 0, L),
where
_ 5
(1'b) z(t, p(t, L)=J{exp(—fp(t + u, t) du) (t + s) D(s, t, L)}ds,
0 0 C
0
(1c) A(t,0,L)=t(t) fD(t—s,s, L) q(s) I(s)ds.tc[0,a). -
Theexpression for z(t, p(t, it), L) represents the present discounted
value of current and future tax depreciation allowances flowing from a
dollar of investment in period t,-iand(ltc) is the total value of tax
depreciation allowances claimed at time t on capital assets purchased
before time 0.
Debt finance is introduced into the rxde1byaugmenting the firm's
cash flow problem with the acquisition and retirement of debt and net—
of—tax interest payments. A firm that finances a proportion (b(t)) of
its investment with debt will have its cash flow incremented by—5—
(5) (1 —k(t)—z(t))b(t) q(t) 1(t),
where the capital outlay (qt) 1(t)) is lowered by the tax credit
(k(t)) and tax depreciation allowances (z(t)). We assume that debt is
retired at an exponential rate (y). In period t, the cash flow
devoted to retirements is the amount of debt issued at time s,
((1 —k(s)—z(s))b(s) q(s) I(s)), multiplied by the "survival" factor
(exp —y(ts)) and the retirement rate (y), and summed from time
tbackward is,
t
(6) f(1—k(s)—z(s))b(s) q(s) I(s) y exp(—y(t —s))is.
Interest payments at time t are the product of the amountofdebt
issued at time s surviving at time t and the interest rate (i(s, ))
prevailing at time s, summed from time t backward, and multiplied by
one less the tax rate at time t (reflecting the tax deductability of
nominal interest payments),
t
(7) (1 -(t))fi(s,) (1 -k(s)-z(s))b(s) q(s) I(s)
c
exp(—y(t —s))ds.
Following our treatment of tax depreciation allowances (n),we
isolate those debt—related factors that depend on current decisions and
those that are predetermined at time t. Summing (6) and (7) yields the
net cost of current and past investment:—6—
(8a) q(t) 1(t) + B(t, 0),
where,
(1 —t (t))i(t, i)+
(8b) q(t) =q(t)(1 -k(t)-z(t)){l +b(t) [ p(t, i) + y
-11),
0 0
(8c) B(t,0) = (1—¶(t)) fi(s, i)X(s,t) ds +y5 X(s, t) ds,
I', I \_I_\\ \ _/_\ -T-(_\ — _( ..( ..
OQ.) Xs,t.j — ictsj—isjj uSj ij tXp—-yt—Sj. I,ELO,wj.
Equation (8b) is the purchase price of a unit of new capital less tax
credits and deductions and the financial advantage of utilizing b
percent of debt for the marginal investment. The latter effect is
represented by the term in braces ,_±i and vanishes in the case of an all
equity firm (b(t) =0).Of the terms in braces, the minus one repre-
sents the benefit of issuing one dollar of debt and is balanced by the
costs per dollar: the net—of—tax interest and retirement payments both
discounted by (p(t, ÷y). This term represents the "gain from
leverage" (c.f., Miller, 1971) accruing to the firm on its marginal
debt. If financial policy eliminates arbitrage profits between the net—
of—tax cost of borrowing and the firm's discount rate, then the term in
braces becomes zero, and the potential advantage to shareholders of
debt—financing, resulting from the tax deductability of the firm's
interest payments, would be eliminated.
Equation (Sc) represents net—of—tax interest and debt retirement
payments at time t on debt acquired at time s surviving at time t
(X(s, t)). When integrated from zero to infinity and discounted by—1—
p(t,it),B(t, 0)is the market value of the firm's debt. This result
holds' for any timepath-sof the variables, but becomes readily apparent
when we assume i(t, it), (t), and p(t, areconstant over time,
in which case, the market (MV(0)) and face (Fv(o)) values of debt at
time tare:
(9a) Mv(o) =[((1— i(n) + y)/(p(it)+y)lFv(o),
0
(9b) FV(0) =f(1—k(s)—z(s))b(s) q(s) I(s) exp(ys) ds.
If interest rates adjust fully to eliminate arbitrage opportunities,
thenthe terminbraces in (9a) becomes unity, and theface and market
values of debt areidentical.
We recognize thatdistributionsto existing shareholders are taxed
at the personal level, andthe net—of—corporatetax cash flow for the
firmdescribedin the above equationsmustbe multiplied by one less the
rateof taxation on equity (ve)• Lastly,we assumethatall prices
growat a constant and fully anticipated exponential rate, it.
Combining these assumptions with (1), (2), (1), and (8), we obtain the
following expression for the value of the firm to existing shareholders
at time 0 as the discounted, net—of—tax cash flOWrJ'—8--
t
(10) v(o) =5exp(— 5 p(s, ds+,tt)(1—
0 0
{(i —(t)) [p F(L(t), K(t)) —w
c 0 0
—(1—k(t)—z(t,p(t, ii),L))q 1(t)
-(1-k(t) -z(t,p(t, it),L))b(t) 1(t) {5
S
exp(—5 (p(t +u,t)+ y)du [Ci—(t+s))i(t, t)
0
C
+ yJds —1.0)+A(t,0, L) —B(t,o)1} dt,
where p0, w0, and are the initial price levels and 1(t) =k(t)
+ ÔK(t).Since both A(t, 0, L) and B(t, o) are predetermined from
time zero onward, they do not influence the firm's optimal choices.
By calculating the Euler equation for capital from Cia), we derive the
following expression for the marginal revenue product of capital (pOFK(•)),




(i —-r) i(c) +y
(i +bE
c —ii). p(ic)+y
By contrast, the conventional user cost of capital (Hall and
Jorgenson, 1967; Brock and Turnovsky, 1981) can be written as
(12) C(it) = +o—)(i—k—Z(pck)L)),—9—
where the discount rate p(i) is a weighted—average of the costs of
debt and eq.uity,.L'
(13) p(t) =b(1—t)i(it) + (1 —b)p().
Under any of the following conditions, the dified (ii) and
conventional (12, 13) user cost expressions are equal:
(iii) —noleverage (b =0),
—theelimination by the firm of arbitrage opportunities between
the costs of debt and equity (p =(1—) i);
—anequality between the rate of capital depreciation and the
effective real retirement rate of debt (a= y+ andan
equality between the value of depreciation allowances
(z(p(t)) =z(p(i))).J
Whenany of these conditions hold, the impact of inflation on investment
incentives is the same under either user cost expression. In particular,
the elimination of arbitrage opportunities implies that b does not
enter either user cost formula; hence the firm's investment decisions
and rket value are invariant with respect to its capital structure.2J
In the absence of (14), the choice of the user cost forila becomes
important and the responses of investment incentives to inflation can
diverage sharply.—10-.
III.The Response of Investment Incentives to Inflation
In this section, we examine four inflation—related factors that
can impact investment incentives. First, since depreciation allowances
are based on historical costs, increases in inflation lead to a decline
in the present value of these deductions (z). Second, the costs of
debt and equity may not adjust completely to inflation, thus reducing
financing costs to the firm. These two effects will exist independently
of the assumption concerning financial arbitrage and, in sub—section A,
will be analyzed under the assumption of capital structure invariance.
Ifcapital structure invariance does not hold, then a third effect
arises due to debt finance, and will needto be evaluated under both
user costs. Fourth, defining the equityholders' discount rate (p) net
of personal taxes can affect the impact of inflation on investment
incentives. The latter effects are assessed in sub—section B, given
responses of nominal debt and equity returns to inflation that are
roughly consistent with the data. The sensitivity of our calculations
to variations in underlying parameters is examined in sub—section C.
A. Capital Structure Invariance
Withthe elimination of arbitrage opportunities between the costs
of debt and equity, we have the following equality,
(15) (1 —'r)i()=
C
Toperform the calculations, we need to specify the response of either
nominal interest or shareholders' discount rates to inflation. We
choose to focus on the former because it is relatively easy to measure—11.-
and has been studied extensively. If the real cost of debt to the firm
is t remain constant, the i(n) must rise by (1/(1 —, the
modified Fisher effect highlighted by Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976)
and implied by the model of Miller (i977)..!P_' The impact on investment
incentives is reported in the upper panel of table I, and these figures
represent the percentage changes in investment incentives at inflation
rates of 3, 6, and 9 percent compared to the no—inflation case.i2J Were
the production function to have a constant elasticity of substitution of
unity, these numbers would correspond exactly to the percentage change
in the optimal capital stock. Hence a positive entry would correspond
to an optimal capital stock larger than that at zero inflation. For a
production function with less than unit elasticity, the change in the
optimalcapital stock wouldbesmaller than thenumbers in the table but
ofthe saxsign. Un&er capital structure invariance, the results are
independent of leverage, and are presented for asset lives of 5, 10, 20,
and 30 years..W It is apparent that investment incentives are reduced
for all asset lives by inflation's effect on the value of depreciation
allowances with the greatest effects felt by longer—lived assets.
It would, however, be misleading to consider only- the effects of
inflation on tax depreciation allowances (cf., Kopcke, 1981) when it is
well—established that net—of—tax debt costs have also fallen with
inflation. Kane, Rosenthal, and Ljung (1983), Peek and Wilcox (1983),
Sununers (1983), and Tanzi (1980), among others, have estimated that
nominal interestrates have risen at mostone—for—onewith inflation.
Toinvestigate the ramifications of this incomplete adjustment, the—12—
bottom panel of Table I repeats the analysis under capital structure
invariance but with di(ii)/dit =1.It remainsthecase that the "gain
from leverage" term in (ii) equals zero and p(it) = sothe
calculations are independent of the leverage ratio (b), andofthe debt
retirement rate (y), and hence are identical between either user cost
expression. In marked contract to the above results, investment
incentives rise at all inflation rates, and the increases are greatest
for the assets with longer lives. Taken together, the results in table
I indicate that the deleterious effect on investment incentives dueto
historical cost depreciation are swamped by the stimulus arising from
the incomplete adjustment of financial returns.
B. Debt and Personal Tax Rates
The arbitrage restriction employed in sub—section A carries with
it the unfortunate implication that if di(it)/dit=1,then the change
in equityholders' nominaldiscountrate with respect to inflation is
(1— oraround .I8. Such a sluggish response is contradicted by
the empirical results of Fama(1981)and Hendershot and Hu (1980). In
this sub—section, the capital structure invariance assumption is
replaced with the empirically—based relation that both p(it) and iC-it)
moveone—for—one with inf1ation.-.J Capital structure invariance may not
hold in equilibriumbecauseof large fixed transactions costs, a lack of
acomplete set of markets (Taggart,1980), or restrictions on the type
ofdebt securities that may be issued (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). The
results with dp(ic)/dJt =1=di(it)/dicare presented in Table II, and
are calculatedfor leverage ratios of .25and.75andfor both—13—
definitions of user costs.-! In both cases it is apparent that more
highly levered investments suffer less disincentives from inflation than
lower levered ones (as a consequence of the declining real after—tax
cost of debt). Short lived assets are also seen to be less affected by
inflation than long lived ones, except in the case of the conventional
model at a high leverage rate. For a highly levered firm, investment
incentives actually increase with inflation in the conventional model,
reflecting the decrease in the post—tax discount rate (ii). The
apparent extreme sensitivity of investment incentives to inflation and
leverage in the conventional framework has been noted previously by Hall
(1981) but, as the results in the top panel of table II suggest, may be
greatly overstated.!i
Table III assesses the fourth and final effect by defining the
shareholders' discount rate net of personal taxes as implied by our
derivation of the user cost in Section II. While recognizing that
estimating the appropriate tax rate is a difficult matter, we assume
that e equals .20, thus dp(t)/dt = — =0.8(alternative
values of te are examined in table Iv). Again it is apparent that
this conventional user cost measure greatly exagerates the effects of
inflation and leverage on investment incentives, compared to the
modified version. In both versions, however, taking account of taxes on
equityholders does mitigate the negative effect of inflation on
investment incentives by amplifying the incomplete adjustment of
financial returns._114_
C.Sensitivity Analysis
Any numerical simulations are, by their very nature, only valid
for the parameters chosen. So in table IV we examine the sensitivity of
our results to two factors which appear most crucial and whose
magnitudes are uncertain.
The first panel presents results comparable to those in the top
right panel of Table Ilib, but with alternative equityholders' tax rates
of 10 and 30 percent. These tax rates make a considerable qualitative
difference to the results, since they change the effective discount rate
of firms. When e is 0.10, all entries in table IV.A are negative; but
these changes in investment incentives become nearly zero, or positive,
when 'e equals 0.30. Since the "true" tax rate is unlikely to be known
with any precision, these results cast doubt on the often proclaimed
harmful effects of inflation and non—neutral tax rules on investment.
The final panel of Table IV investigates the sensitivity of the
results to alternative assumptions about the adjustment of equity
returns to inflation. It examines the impacts of 80% and 120%
adjustment. Again it is seen that, even for our modified user cost,
which is less sensitive than the conventional expression, the effects of
inflation on investment incentives depends strongly on the exact
assumptions made about the inflation adjustment of financial returns.—15—
IV.The Treasury's Tax Reform Proposal
The above results highlight that calculations of investment
incentives are sensitive both to a number of underlying parameters and
to the user cost formulation. To illustrate this sensitivity, we next
examine the tax reform plan presented by the U.S. Treasury (November
1984). The Treasury Proposal is designed to eliminate distortions among
business assets and inflation rates by removing the investment tax
credit, indexing and decelerating depreciation allowances, lowering the
corporate tax rate, and allowing only the real part of interest payments
tobe deductible from pre—tax income.-i The models develped above can
assess the extent to which the Proposal is consistent with the Reagan
kdministration'stwin goals of enhancing investment incentives and
adopting a tax code that is neutral between asset livesJi'
The incentive effects of the Treasury Proposal are shown in Table
V, which contains the percentage changes in investment incentives
resulting from the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA)
adopted in 1982 and from the Treasury Proposal, both relative to the tax
code prevailing in 1979. Inflation and financing rates are based on
observations for the latter part of 1984. Under either user cost
formulation, the provisions of TEFRA substantially enhanced investment
incentives. For both long—lived and, especially, short—lived assets,
the Treasury proposal clearly imparts less stimulus than was forthcoming
under TEFRA.—16—
The calculations are based on the partial eq.uilibriurn assumption
that the adoption of the Treasury Proposal wouldnot,on its own, reduce
financing rates. It is possible that the proposals might result in
lower interest rates, as a consequence of the reduction of individual
tax rates, restrictions on the tax—deductibility of personal borrowing,
and the partial deductibility of dividend payments. If the proposal
were to be accompanied by a two point reduction in financing rates, and
no change in inflation, then the investment incentives would be as
generous as under the Carter tax policy, for all lowly leverered
assets. However, since the value of the debt deductions would be
reduced by the exclusion of the nominal part of interest payments and by
the lower corporate tax rate, highly levered assets would continue to be
treated less favorably under the Treasury Proposal.
To assess the neutrality of the proposed changes in the tax code
(as they directly affect business fixed investment), we calculate the
"tax wedge" between the net marginal product of capital, (a— 6)and the
opportunity cost of funds (p).Jffi-J The value in the table indicates the
absolute amountthatthe net marginal product of capital must be raised
(if positive) to acconiodate tax effects: if no tax parameters were
present, the wedge would be zero. As can be seen in Table VI, the wedge
under the Carter tax policy (but with current financing rates) differs
greatly between different assets. Under TEFRA, tax wedges are uniformly
lower, especially for equipment, but substantial variation still
remains. Eliminating this variation was one of the goals of the
Treasury Proposal, but neutrality holds under only a limited set of—17—
circumstances. The conventional specification generates tax wedges that
are stable across asset lives and, for a given life, among inflation
rates (cf. columns (7) and (8)). However, neutrality does not hold
under our modified user cost formulation. Variations among assets are
particularly evident for the ndified user cost and a high leverage
ratio. With 5 percent inflation and a leverage ratio of .75, a 30 year
asset must earn a return that is 3.6 percentage points higher than an
asset purchased under the same conditions but having a 5 year life.
Were the marginal leverage ratio .25, the tax wedge would be only 2.1
percentage points.
V. Summary
In recent years, much attention has been given to the supposed
deleterious effects of inflation and existing tax rules on investment
incentives. To analyze these relationships, we have developed a
modified definition of the user cost of capital that takes explicit
account of the ownership of the firm and of debt acq.uisition,
retirement, and net—of—tax interest payments. Using this formula as
well as the conventional expression, we have simulated the response of
investment under a wide variety of assumptions and have found that,
investment incentives are depressed when the sole effect of
inflation is to lower the value of tax depreciation allowances
(Table I.A);—18—
— however,the inconiplete adjustment of interest rates, coupled with
a capital structure invariance assumption, imparts a major
stimulus to capital formation (table I.B);
— whencapital structure invariance is replaced by the empirically—
based assumption that the nominal rates on debt and equity move
one—for—one with inflation, investment incentives fall with
inflation in the modified model, whereas for highly levered
assets, the conventional model implies they rise with inflation
(table II); in both models, investment incentives are enhanced
somewhat, ceteris paribus, by debt financing;
— definingthe shareholder's discount rate net of personal taxes, as
implied by the user cost derivation, attenuates any negative
effects of inflation on investment incentives (table III);
—lastly,the interaction of the tax code and inflation do not
necessarily discriminate against longer—lived assets except under
capital structure invariance and when nominal interest rates
adjust completely to inflation (table I.A).
Hence, contrary to the claims of some authors, our results cast
considerable doubt on the central role of inflation in reducing capital
formation in the 1970s and in discriminating against longer lived
assets. The paper ends by drawing attention to the high sensitivity of
all measures of investment incentives to assumed parameters that are—19—
unlikely to be known inthe aggregate with anyaccuracy.This, in
itself, suggests caution in undertakingpolicyanalysis on the basis of
existing economic itde1s.—20—
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Footnotes
Inflation my also create artificial inventory profits, but proper
analysis of the relationship between this channel and investment
incentives requires a different framework (Chirinko, 1983) than that
presented in this paper.
Aivazian and Callen (1979) have shown that the ecjuityholders'
discount rate will be the appropriate criterion to guide investment
if the firm is in a perfectly competitive industry or in steady—
state equilibrium.
It should be noted that z(-) depends on the path of current and
future values of p and that (1k) can be derived only when (3) is
embedded in a discounted cash flow expression (e.g., (10)).
To derive (8b), we assume that (t), i(t, andp(t, t)are
constant from t onward. These .ssuinptions could be abandoned, and
the debt term at time t would become
5
5{ exp(—5(p(t +u,t)+ y))du(i —(t+s))i(t, +y}ds.
0 0
C
Notethe similarities between this expression and (Itb).
In an elaboration of Auerbach's (1979) result concerning wealth
maximizing shareholders, Edwards and Keen (l98) have shown that
"policies that maximize shareholder wealth can always be
characterized as policies that maximize equity value" (p. 212).
The user cost of capital is strictly relevant only in the steady
state, and we need to assume that the rates of personal and
corporate taxation, the investment tax credit, interest, and
discount rates are constant from time 0 onward.
.L1 Ratherthen representing a marginal value, the parameter b in
(13) is the average leverage ratio. Since our simulations relate
to the steady—state, this difference is immaterial to the
interpretation of the results.
The latter equality would exist under a tax system that allowed
immediate expensing of capital expenditures z(p(it)) =z(p))
=
suchas currently prevails in the United Kingdom.—2b—
-9-!Thisresult would not hold if b were determined endogenously, a
modification that could be straightforwardly implemented.
Following Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1979), we could assume
that the interest rate increases with the firm's debt—equity ratio
and, with the appropriate transition equation relating the stock
and flow of debt, could derive an optimal path for b from an
optimal control framework. We have chosen not to pursue this
extension because, doing so would have necessitated examining the
sensitivity of our results to a number of arbitrary specifications
of the relationship between the interest rate and the debt—equity
ratio. Our assumption of a constant debt—equity ratio, while only
an approximation, is not at odds with ratios observed since the
middle of the 1970s (Gordon and Malkiel, 1981, Table I).
In Miller's Figure 1, replace r by (r0 +
Anumber of other parameters are needed for the calculations. The
investment tax credit rate (k) is taken as 6.1%, 10%, and 5% for
assets with 5, 10, and 20—30 year lives, respectively. (Thus we
recognize that approximately one—half of structures, as defined in
the National Income and Product Accounts, enjoy the benefit of the
investment credit (Corcoran, 1919).) The exponential rate of debt
retirement (y)is chosen at 0.2, implying that 95% of debt will
be retired after 15 years. The corporate income tax rate (
is set constant at 52%: a I8% marginal Federal rate plus 14%, hich
is the average amount of income taxes paid to State and Local
governments from 1970—1979 (Feldsteia, Dicks—Mireaux, and Poterba,
1983, Table 3). The equity tax rate ( )was estimated as the
average of marginal tax rates facing diferent classes of dividend
receipients. The results of this paper are based on values of .20
and .30 reflecting, respectively, whether transactions or market
value weights were used in constructing the averages (Chirinko,
1982). We assume throughout that, at zero inflation, the rate of
interest is 3 percent. This number is not atypical of the ex—post
real return obtained in the 1970s. The reported results are quite
insensitive to the actual magnitudes.
The rate of economic depreciation (6) and the assumed asset
lifetime (L) are clearly not independent, and we choose 5 such
that at the end of L years 90 percent of the asset has been
depreciated. Hence 6 =1—exp(ln(0.1)/L).The z(.) (tax
depreciation) function uses the sum—of—years—digits method for
asset lives 5 and 10 years, and 150 percent—declining balance
method with a switch to straight line after one third of the
asset's life has passed for 20 and 30 year assets. Asset lives
used in calculating z have been reduced by 20 percent to accord
with practices under the Treasury Department's asset depreciation
range system.—25—
The quarterly (Q6) and annual (A6) regressions of Fama (1981)
imply that dp(a)/dit =1,while the calculations of Hendershott
and I-lu (1980, PP. 336—339) imply a value of 0.87.
Feldstein and Summers (1979) have argued that the tax subsidy to
debt finance resulting from the deductability of nominal interest
payments is largely offset by the taxation of nominal interest
receipts accruing to bondholders. Such general equilibrium
considerations imply that the nominal interest rate should move
significantly more than the observed point—for—point with changes
in the inflation rate and, in assessing investment incentives in
the 1970s, we believe it is more useful to utilize observed,
though still unexplained, relationships in a partial equilibriwn
model.
In their careful study of effective tax rates, King and Fullerton
(l98I) find a significant amount of dispersion with respect to
inflation (Figure 7.1). These calculations are based on the
conventional user cost formula (altered to reflect taxes on wealth
and inventories), and the dispersion may be attenuated in the
modified user cost, especially since the proportion of investment
projects financed by debt varies greatly (Appendix A). Since, in
their study, the costs of debt and equity finance differ, our
modified user cost would seem to be the appropriate formula.
The Indexing feature of the Proposal calls for the undepreciated
asset value to be adjusted upwards by the rate of inflation.
However, when the rate of inflation exceeds the depreciation rate,
which is most likely the case for longer—lived assets, the
inflation adjusted value can explode. In our simulations, we
avoid this problem by requiring that the inflation—adjusted,
undepreciated asset value not exceed the purchase price of the
asset, and that depreciation occurs over a maximum period of 65
years.
ill Weare not assessing the effects of all aspects of the Treasury
Program (for example, we ignore the changes in the tax treatment
of inventories) but merely those of paramount importance to
business fixed investment.
Some studies compute effective tax rates by dividing this tax
wedge by either (C —6),or p. As noted by Bradford and Fullerton
(1981), effective tax rates may flucuate wildly, since either of
these denominators may approach zero. We therefore report the tax
wedge which is not susceptible to this behavior.—26—
Table I
Percentage Changes in Investment Incentives With The











5 — 6.2 —11.2 —15.3
10 — 9.9 —17.0 —22.2
20 —17.2 —26.5 —32.1





Rate .03 .06 .09
(1) (2) (3)
5 1.0 2.14
10 2.0 .4 10.1
20 3.3 11.5 25.9
30 7.4 25.2 61.3
NOTE: All entries are calculated as the ratio of the user cost of capital
at a zero inflation rate to the user cost for the indicated inflation
rate, less one, multiplied by 100. The calculations are based on
either (ii) or (12) and on the parameters discussed in fns. 11 and 12.—27—
Table II
Percentage Changes in Investment Incentives Without
















(1) (2) (3) (1) (5) (6)
5 — — 8.2 —11.3 — 1.7 — 3.2 —
10 — 7.5 —13.1 —17.3 — 1.8— 8. —11.1
20 —19.6 — 9.9 —15.2 —18.3
30 —13.2 —19.8 —23.6 —10.7 —15.5 —17.9
B.Conventional
AssetInflation b= .25 b= .75
Life Rate .03 .06 .09 .03 .06 .09
(1) (2) (3) (1) (5) (6)
5 —1.2 —7.0—10. —0.9 —13 —1.2
10 —6.lt —11.1 —1IL.14 —1.1 —1.0 0.3
20 —io.1 —16.0 —19.0 —2.1 —0.2 5.2
30 —10.6 —15.0 _i6.1 0.0 6.7 20.
Note: Entries are calculated as described in the note to Table I. Panel A is
based on (11); Panel B on (12).—28—
Table III
Percentage Changes in Investment Incentives Without
The Capital Structure Invariance Assumption
di(it)/d =1,dp(t)/dit =(i—e'e =.20
NOTE: Entries are calculated as described in the note to Table
based on (ii); Panel B on (12).





















5 — 2.14 .J414 — 5.9 —0.7 —1.3 —1.7
10 — 14.0 —6.8 — 8.5 2.14 —3.8
20 — 6.7 —9.8 —io.6 —5.1 —6.9 —6.5














































Percentage Changes in Investment Incentives Without
The Capital Structure Invariance Assumption
Sensitivity Analysis With The Modified User Cost
b =.75
NOTE: Entries are calculated as in
in parameters.
Table III except for the indicated changes
AssetInflation
Life Rate








(i) (2) (3) ('4) (5) (6)
— 1.2 — 2.3 — 3.2 —0.3 —0.3 —0.1
— 3.6 — 6.1 — 7.9 —1.1 —1.2 —0.6
— 7.6 —11.3 —12.8 —2.5 —1.9 1.0















































Percentage Change in Investment Incentives
Relative to the 1979 Tax Code
i =.11,p =.12,it= .05,e .0
A. Modified User Cost
b=.25 b=.75
AssetTax
Life Program TEFRA Treasury TEFRA Treasury
(1) (2) (3) (ii.)
5 1li..0 —5.1 13.5 —11.6
10 18.3 —8.0 17.7 —13.8
20 14.4 5.2 14.0 —i.li.
30 13.5 6.9 13.0 0.2
B. Conventional User Cost
b=.25 b=.75
AssetTax
Life Program TEFRATreasury TEFRATreasury
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5 15.1 —6.3 19.5 —13.3
10 18.9 —10.1 20.0 —20.5
20 14.o 0.6 11.5 —17.0
30 13.4 0.7 11.2 —21.2
Note: All entries are calculated as the ratio of the user cost of capital
under the 1979 tax code to the user cost for the indicated tax
program, less one, multiplied by 100. Panel A is based on (ii),
and Panel B on (12). Our characterizations of the 1979 and TEFRA
tax programs follow Gravelle (1983), and the Treasury's plans (u.s.
Treasury, 1984).—31—
TableVI




AssetTax Carter TEFRATreasury Carter TEFRATreasury LifeRegixir=.05it.05,t.05 it.0 t=.05,t=.05 i=.05 ,=.O
(1) (2)(3) (U) (5)(6) (7) (5)
5 1.83.7 14.5 )4•14 —3.2 —7.9 2.11.5
10 2.5 —1.95.1 14.9 —0.7 —4.6 3.11 3.0
20 7.6 14.5 6.116.3 11.92.2 5.2 11.9
30 8.1 5.56.76.3 5.73.5 5.75.1
B. Conventional
b= .25 b=.75
AssetTax Carter TEFRATreasury Carter TEFRATreasury
LifeRegime r.05it.05it=.05 it=.0 irt=.05 ,t=.05=.05 =.0
(1) (2)(3) (U) (5)(6) (7)(5)
5 1.14 —4.6 14.14 14.5 14.2 —10.51.71.8
10 1.14 —3.1 14.5 14.5 —14.0 —7.81.81.8
20 5.7 3.05.65.7 —0.5 —2.22.82.8
30 6.1 3.85.95.6 —0.2 —i.63.32.8
Note:All entriesare calculated as the user cost of capital less the
exponentialrate of depreciation less the real discount rate, taken as
5.0percentFurther details of the user costs from which these are
derivedcanbe found in the note to Table V.